ABSTRACT. Does land tenure form affect farmlevel productivity? The answer, from farm-level data for an oil palm project in Papua New Guinea, is in the affirmative. Analysis of farm-level output, controlling for all measured inputs, shows systematic differences in productivity across three land tenure types, namely, farms under customary purchase agreements, those under the land settlement scheme, and those under village-owned land schemes. The empirics suggest that the higher productivity is due to benefits from economies of scale and absence of income sharing enjoyed by farms with improved tenure security. (JEL Q15)
I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between land tenure security and agricultural productivity remains a hotly debated issue. While several theoretical papers suggest that secure property rights to land, such as those provided for under individualized title, is likely to raise investments, improve access to credit, and induce greater effort on the part of the owners, the empirics in support of these propositions have been both scarce and less than convincing.
1 This lack of evidential support to the hypothesized links between tenure security and agricultural productivity could be due to several factors including the absence of such a link, the inability to measure outputs and inputs correctly, and the difficulties of trying to control for all possible factors that impinge on agricultural productivity. The motivations for deciphering the contribution of tenure forms on agricultural productivity, however, are compelling. Many land reform programs within poor agrarian economies such as those in Africa and the Pacific are premised on the assumption that improved tenure security will lead to increased agricultural productivity and thus reduce rural poverty. Land reforms in Papua New Guinea, the context for this paper, were motivated by these very considerations.
This paper seeks to contribute to the extant debate that various land tenure regimes (e.g., private, common, and indigenous) leads to variable levels of resource allocation and thus farm productivity. The debate revolves around the notion that inefficiencies arise because indigenous rights are ambiguous and benefits are communally dispersed, thus prone to noncompensated appropriation; as a corollary, insecure tenure leads to suboptimal investment, poor access to credit and finance, and in some cases constrained market access (see Demsetz 1967; Dorner 1972; Johnson 1972) . The counterargument on the relationship between tenure and investment demand is made by Sjaastad and Bromley (1997) , who argue that indigenous rights are often neither communal nor ambiguous, are flexible enough to permit individualization of rights, and state intervention in natural resource management and land matters is more harmful than beneficial. The contribution of property right regime to agricultural productivity and thus economic growth can be placed within the broader literature on institutions and their role in development. Land tenure arrangements and their contribution to agricultural productivity picks on a strand of this much broader literature. The policy implications of this research, however, are substantial. Most of the land reforms being undertaken in several developing countries are premised on a positive and quantitatively significant causal impact of tenure security on agricultural productivity (see World Bank 2003 for an extensive survey of this literature). A number of governments in developing countries with financial and technical support from donor agencies have initiated and pursued land reforms as part of their poverty-reduction programs. Papua New Guinea, and the Pacific islands as a group, has not been immune from this influence.
Most of the international empirical literature on land tenure arrangements and farm-level productivity is based on data collected from the Asian and African continents. One set of studies, mostly drawing on the Asian experience, lends support to the proposition that tenure security raises agricultural productivity. Feder et al. (1988) , for example, use farmlevel data from rural Thailand to argue that increased tenure security raises agricultural productivity. Feder and Nisho (1999) provide a survey of a decade of published empirical research from developing countries, coming to the conclusion that the evidence from Southeast Asian and Latin American countries is one of a positive association between tenure security, access to credit, levels of investment, and farm-level productivity. The evidence from studies on the African experience, however, is less than conclusive on the hypothesized link between tenure security and agricultural productivity. Smith (2004 Smith ( , 1463 notes: ''The interaction among land tenure, fixed investments, and productivity may therefore be far from linear, and research to date leaves old questions only ambiguously answered.'' Tenure security is hypothesized to impact on agricultural productivity via two distinct channels: first, via improving access to credit (Carter and Olinto 2003) ; and second, by inducing long-term investments via reducing uncertainty with respect to the rights to the future income (Schweigert 2006) . These two channels complement each other in that the first avails the credit to enable long-term investments for raising income.
We use farm-level survey evidence of smallholder oil palm growers from a project in Papua New Guinea to show that tenure security is positively correlated with farmlevel productivity. This finding, based on a carefully executed survey and subsequent statistical analysis, shows that tenure type is a significant determinant of agricultural productivity. We also find evidence in support of the proposition that exclusive rights to the stream of income from harvests of the crop matter for choice of variable inputs and thus productivity.
II. THE SETTING
The primary data for the analysis that follows is drawn from a purpose-built and conducted survey within the smallholder oil palm sector of the Hoskins project, located in the West New Britain province of Papua New Guinea. Figure 1 shows the location of the Hoskins Oil Palm Project, while Figure 2 provides details on the province itself. Several features of this case study make it ideal for an analysis of the contribution of alternative forms of land tenure arrangements on agricultural productivity. Oil palm, being a tree crop with a productive tree life of some 20 years, makes tenure security a prerequisite for its cultivation. The crop is cultivated on an estate run by the company that mills the fruit and exports the oil and the by-products. However, some 7,000 smallholders working on blocks of land surrounding the company estate grow oil palm and supply fresh fruit bunches (FFBs) to the milling company at a price linked to the world market price for the exports. The smallholder sector, thus, comprises a competitive fringe to the nucleus estate run by the milling company.
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than land and labor used by the smallholder sector in producing the FFBs are provided for by the milling company, often on shortterm credit; thus, there is little heterogeneity in terms of the quality (as against the quantity) of inputs used by the smallholder sector. The major item of technology that impacts on yield is the subspecies of seeds used-this once again is provided for by the company. The crop begins to bear fruit 18 months after planting and continues to do so for the next 20 years, with annual yields very much dependent on application of variable inputs. Regarding the yield, the input of labor for harvesting is essential for the realization of any income in any given period. The palms are killed and the land replanted on a 20-year cycle. We consider the investment channel for the smallholder oil palm sector in Hoskins here simply because access to credit has been found not to be a crucial determinant of productivity (see Yala 2007 on the last claim). The quality and quantity of land used differs across the individual smallholders. But even here, the government had fixed the size of the blocks to 6 hectares when settling the smallholder growers on state land. The company, moreover, restricts planting by issuing a fixed number of seedlings to a grower. While the quality of land is less than uniform, the crop is grown on a single large flood plain. It, moreover, has very specific needs in terms of the soil type and water, factors that were taken into consideration when the land was first made available for settlement by the smallholders. These considerations remain paramount in the expansion of farms within the vicinity of the mill. The company provides transportation to the mills at a uniform cost to the growers; thus the incentives to produce the crop are the same regardless of the spatial distribution of the farms. The farmers, however, have complete freedom in the choice of the quantity of variable inputs such as labor, fertilizer, and herbicides applied. Of most relevance to this paper, the smallholder sector operates from three distinct land tenure arrangements, namely, the original land settlement schemes (LSS) where state land with a lease of 99 years was available for growing the crop; and another two distinct arrangements that operate on land held under customary title. Within the latter group, settlers from outside the region have purchased land for growing oil palm from the customary owners (CP blocks) and farms operated by the customary owners themselves under village-owned plantations schemes (VOP blocks).
Papua New Guinea, with a total population of some 6 million and a land area of some 6,400 km 2 , is the largest of the Pacific island countries. The nation, on independence from Australia in 1975, inherited a two-tiered land-tenure system. Some 3% of the total land mass classified as state land is what was alienated by the colonial government as freehold. This land is governed by an English-based statute law. The remaining 97% is held under customary title and administered via customary law, with the latter sanctioned by the Land Act (of 2000) and the Papua New Guinea constitution. Land under the customary system is passed across generations through two distinct channels: via the females, this being the matrilineal system that is practiced within the Hoskins area; and through males, this being the patrilineal system practiced in many other places within the province and elsewhere in the nation.
Smallholders growing oil palm on LSS block are either descendants of the first settlers that were brought in by the colonial government, or those who have purchased land from the original settlers (see Hulme 1984) . The LSS blocks are each 6 ha in size, with the leases issued in the name of the first settler. The original lessees of Hoskins were selected by the colonial government through a competitive process in 1968 and were provided with assistance in the form of subsidized credit and inputs to start farming. While the leases are transferable, via sale or bestowment, many of the existing growers are descendents of the original settlers, with many of the occupants without a formal title to the land farmed. Many of these families have expanded in size while remaining on their blocks since first arrival.
In some cases, the extended family harvests in turns, holds multiple ATM (automated teller machine) cards, and thus draws on the proceeds from the sale of FFBs on a rotation. The VOP blocks, in contrast, comprise smaller surveyed blocks on customary land deemed suitable for growing of oil palm by the industry corporation. The customary owners, after acquiring their (VOP) blocks, then choose to either grow the crop or sell (lease) their landholding to others. The latter comprises what we call the CP blocks, where the purchasers are from outside the landowning community. These purchasers sometimes acquire multiple, and often contiguous, blocks; thus the farms range in size from 2 to 10 ha. The difference in land tenure arrangement for growing oil palm using close to homogenous technology and inputs provides us with the data to test the contribution of each of the above-mentioned tenure arrangements on farm-level productivity.
III. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The two principal methods used for productivity analysis include the use of the index number approach (see Gavian and Ehui 1999 as an example) or the use of econometrics. Each has its own advantages and weaknesses, but both draw on a simple production function of the form
where Q is the level of output, X constitutes a vector of inputs, T denotes technology, D is an indicator (dummy) variable that takes a value of unity when a particular feature is present for the particular observation and zero otherwise, and i indexes for the individual observations. The function F, the farm in this case, transforms the inputs together with any traits intrinsic to the farm into output Q. In the case of multiple outputs and inputs and with prices that gyrate over time, the index number approach, as illustrated by Gavian and Ehui (1999) , provides a better means to computing productivity compared to the use of the econometric technique. The use of econometrics is particularly hampered by the lack of a sufficient number of observations. In the case being explored here, we have a single output, a sufficiently large number of observations and thus the necessary degrees of freedom, and data for a single period and with homogenous prices both for the inputs and the outputs, which all make the use of the econometric methodology more appropriate.
For analytical tractability, we assume the function F to be Cobb-Douglas. All farms are also assumed to have access to a uniform technology. The production function in [1], thus, is assumed to take the form
where D denotes the dummy variable, in this case the tenure type, noting that the objective of this paper is to decipher the impact of land tenure type on productivity.
Taking the natural log of equation [2] after using land, a constituent of the vector of inputs X, as the numeraire, gives [3] where N denotes the land area, x denotes the intensity of use (that is the quantity of input used per hectare of land) of the respective inputs in the vector X, j indexes the individual inputs, and b is the input elasticity. In the case of a linearly homogenous production function of the form shown in equation [2] , the term P j b j { 1 will equal zero; this term being strictly positive would denote the presence of economies of scale, an issue that is tested explicitly in the empirics that follow. Equation [3] decomposes the potential sources of differences in land productivity across farms into three sources, namely, that due to differences in input intensities such as the usage of fertilizer and herbicides per hectare of land, that due to economies of scale, and that arising out of attributes, such as land tenure type, captured within the dummy variable D above. The estimable form of equation [3] that is used in the empirics that follow takes the form
where e i values capture farm-specific idiosyncratic factors and any measurement errors in the data. The parameter estimates from equation [4] can be mapped back to the production function given as equation [2] . While farmers have little choice in the quality and possibly the range of inputs they have access to, they have complete flexibility in choosing the quantity of each input that they use. In other words, input intensities (the x j 's) in equation [4] may be determined by the land-tenure type, that is, D i . This is explicitly tested for by estimating input intensities by land-tenure type of the form
When the dependent variable in equation [5] is binary, that is, it takes either a value of 1 or 0, such as whether herbicides are used or not; the model is estimated as both a linear probability model and a probit model.
IV. DATA AND EMPIRICS
The list of growers as of 2003 was obtained from the industry body. Data from the estate company was then used to subdivide the smallholders into the three land tenure types, namely, LSS, VOP, and CP. A random sample, stratified by land tenure type, of growers was then taken (Deaton 1997, 38) . Each of these growers was then approached and the requisite data collected on farm size, level of production, use of inputs, other sources of income, and access to credit. This data was then complemented with the information obtained from the milling company. The number of growers chosen per land tenure type was as follows: 48 from LSS, 48 from VOP, and 32 from CP arrangements. Thirty additional growers from each group were selected as reserves for replacement during the survey. The reserve list was used when the first selected growers were difficult to find, either because they were out of the province, in hospital, or could not be found after making three attempts. Taking into account cost in terms of both time and money, the sample used is of an appropriate size (Bartlett, Kotrlik, and Higgins 2001) . Table 1 provides summary statistics of the variables for which data was collected via the survey. In terms of household characteristics, the average age of the household head was 42.59 years, 90% of the household heads were males, 16% of the household heads had outside employment, and each household comprised an average of six adults and five dependents. The distribution of these characteristics was far from uniform; the oldest household head in our sample was 80 years of age, while the largest household had some 17 adults. One household held seven blocks under oil palm while another had just 58% of a block under the crop. Access to income from the harvest of oil palm was organized around the number of bank cards held by the household. Payments from the purchasing company, New Britain Oil Palm Limited (NBPOL), were credited into the nominated bank accounts of the growers. The individual households accessed these funds, on internal arrangements, on the basis of ATM cards held by the members of the (extended) family. Families, on average, held two ATM cards, with one case of some five cards held by an extended smallholder household. The arrangements within families ranged from savings for specific purposes such as weddings, school fees, church contributions, and so forth, with proceeds directed to nominated bank accounts. Some families organized their harvests in rotation; thus payments were accessed on the basis of the group engaged in the harvest of the crop.
In terms of land characteristics, the average area of a block is 6 ha, output per farm is some 27 tons of FFB per year, only 85(3) Chand and Yala: Land Tenure and Productivity14% of the sample held a title to the block, and some 58% of the block holders had expanded on the area under cultivation since first settling on the block. On use of variable inputs, fertilizer use ranged from nil to 80 bags, with an average use per block of 13 bags. Of note is the fact that a number of growers made nil use of variable inputs, reasons for which are explored in some detail in the modeling of productivity that follows.
Results
The modeling that follows uses the hectares of land used for growing oil palm per block as the numeraire. Productivity is measured in terms of tons of FFB produced per hectare of land under oil palm. The intensity of input usage is also quantified in terms of per hectare of land under the crop. The first part of the analysis examines correlates of productivity with tenure type. Of the 108 farms for which output data were available, 91 did not have a title. The average output of FFB per hectare of land under oil palm for titled farms at 6.65 tons was 0.12 tons greater than that for untitled farms. This difference, however, was not statistically significant at the 5% level. Among other noticeable correlates was a positive and statistically significant relationship between having other sources of income and a title. The causation between these variables could run in either direction: having other income may provide the liquidity to acquire a title, or having the title in the first place may enable the holder to invest in a business as a source of offfarm income. There was anecdotal support for both of these propositions. Separating out the contribution of each of these channels is part of ongoing research. In terms of usage of variable inputs, fertilizer and herbicide use was greater in larger farms; this could reflect economies of scale in the application of the above and/or the greater substitution possibilities between use of household labor on smaller blocks with the use of fertilizer and herbicide on larger blocks. Table 2 shows the levels and distribution of productivity and input usage across the three land tenure arrangements and that for the survey sample as a whole. The average output per hectare of crop under oil palm, this being the measure of land productivity, is shown in the third row for the 108 farms in our sample of 128. The average land productivity was 6.55 tons with a minimum of 0.25, a maximum of 29.15, and a standard deviation of 4.19. Note the differences in land productivity across the three land tenure types. The average for CP farms was 8.56 compared to the corresponding figures for LSS and VOP farms of 6.23 and 5.50 (tons per hectare), respectively. Average land productivity, measured in terms of output of FFB per hectare of land, is greater under CP agreement compared to the rest of the farms, with a corresponding figure of 5.88.
2 While the average figures show that the LSS blocks come next in terms of average productivity, this difference is not statistically significant at the 5% level. The data in Table 2 also show differences in the intensity of input usage Note: Output and inputs are all expressed per hectare of land; thus, output is a measure of productivity. Units of measurement: output is tons of FFB per hectare of oil palm; labor use is number of adults per hectare of land; fertilizer use is number of 50-kg bags per hectare; and farm size is in hectares. CP, customary purchase; FFB, fresh fruit bunch; LSS, land settlement scheme; VOP, village-owned plantations.
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Chand and Yala: Land Tenure and Productivityacross the three land tenure types. The averages show that the VOP blocks use more labor and fertilizer per hectare of oil palm; and, they are on average nearly onehalf and one-third the size of CP and LSS blocks, respectively. Total factor productivity of VOP blocks, therefore, is the lowest among the three land tenure forms. The determinants of farm productivity were next examined by estimating equation [4] above, using data for the 88 farms for which the full set of requisite data was available. The regression estimates and the diagnostics are reported in Table 3 . Column 1 in Table 3 reports results of a regression of the log productivity on log fertilizer use, log labor employed, and the two land tenure types, CP and LSS, with VOP being the excluded category. While fertilizer use and land tenure type have a significant impact on land productivity, the coefficient estimates for labor, though positive, are not statistically different from zero. Of interest here is the fact that the CP land tenure type has an average total factor productivity 1.76 times that of farms under VOP arrangements, while the corresponding figure for LSS farms is 1.95 when inputs of fertilizer and labor are held constant. This finding is different from the simple comparisons of land productivity provided above.
Column 2 of Table 3 provides estimates from an expanded model that includes Size and Size 2 , to account for possible diminishing returns to scale, Age and Age 2 terms, to capture possible contribution of experience and its diminishing returns, the same for the years of education of the household head, and a dummy variable for Title to capture the potential contribution of having a title on farm productivity. The coefficient estimates compared to those reported in Column 1 are similar. We thus consider only the parameter estimates for the additional variables introduced in the model. The coefficient estimate for Size is positive and statistically significant. The parameter estimates for Size and Size 2 suggest that farm productivity is maximized at a approximately 4.6 ha, this being somewhat greater than the mandated 4-ha plantations per block. None of the other variables, however, have a statistically significant association with farm-level productivity. The results in Table 3 , thus, show that CP and LSS tenure types are more productive than VOP arrangements, but why? Table 4 explores input usage by tenure type through estimation of equation [5] . Among the statistically significant partial correlates for fertilizer use is Size, while that for herbicide use is both Size and the CP and LSS land tenure forms. Hired labor does not show a statistically significant association with any of the land tenure forms. Thus, land tenure form seems to be a significant determinant of the use of fertilizer and herbicide, this being the case even when scale effects are controlled for. CP and LSS farms make greater use of variable inputs compared to those under VOP arrangements. This fact, however, cannot explain the greater productivity observed in the estimates reported in Table 3 , given that input usage has already been controlled for. Table 4 , therefore, considers the potential (Cameron and Trivedi 1990 ) using STATA's ''imtest'' command with the null assumption for normally distributed error terms was rejected for the model reported in Column 1 of Table 3 (p-value of 0.0429). This same test, however, failed to reject the assumption of normality (pvalue of 0.8337) for the expanded model. CP, customary purchase; LSS, land settlement scheme. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
scale and effort channels for the higher productivity observed in CP and LSS farms compared to VOP farms. Table 5 investigates factors that are correlated with farms being expanded and those where harvesting is undertaken in rotation. Regarding the first, farms under both LSS and CP land tenure arrangements have experienced expansion in the area under oil palm cultivation. Regarding the second, however, it is only LSS farms that have had a tendency to harvest in rotation. This may be partly due to the fact that LSS farms are older and thus house larger households-sometimes families extending three generations. This practice of dividing the proceeds from the harvests would be a disincentive to investments and exertion of effort into increasing yield (Demsetz 1967) , thus it may explain the lower productivity of LSS farms vis-à-vis those under CP arrangements. Establishing this direction of causation conclusively, however, is tricky. CP growers, for example, have smaller families but also comprise individuals who have taken the initiative to acquire land for growing of the crop. These individuals, thus, may have the intrinsic qualities of risk-taking and a belief in their capacities to improve on their well-being through farming on land acquired through CP arrangements. Imputing for the above in the difference in total factor productivity between CP and LSS farms is part of ongoing research.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The empirics in the last section suggest that land tenure form is correlated with farm-level productivity. This finding is based on survey-level evidence on output of a single homogenous commodity produced with uniform technology and material inputs. Farmers, however, have had freedom to choose the quantities of inputs used and the level of effort expended in producing the output. Farm sizes have differed considerably, thus the potential benefits of economies of scale have been accounted for in computing farm-level productivity. The results suggest that the benefits of economies of scale for the smallholder sector are maximized at ap- Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Chand and Yala: Land Tenure and Productivityproximately 5 ha; most farms fall well short of this figure. The first policy lesson from this exercise, therefore, is that a relaxation of regulatory barriers to expansion of farms, thus, may deliver gains in productivity. It has been noted that only LSS and CP blocks have expanded, thus scale effects seem to favor these two land tenure types over VOP blocks, the smallest of the three. The second policy lesson from the above may be that it is the lack of secure tenure that is constraining expansion and thus productivity improvements on the VOPs. The parameter estimates reported in Table 3 suggest that CP and LSS farms have productivity greater than VOP farms. If this difference is due to tenure type, then land reforms aimed at availing greater tenure security have the potential to raise farm-level productivity. Harvest in rotation, however, seems to be present only within LSS blocks. This may explain the lower productivity of LSS blocks compared to CP blocks, where households do not engage in such practices. This difference is not due to differences in tenure security per se, but more likely the outcome of large families resulting from the long-established settlers on LSS blocks. Many of those now on CP blocks are former settlers from LSS blocks, thus the CP blocks may have attracted the most entrepreneurial of the LSS farmers. The higher productivity of the CP blocks, thus, may at least be partly the result of this selectivity bias. Purging the contribution of the above in computing farm-level productivity is a difficult exercise, but the policy implications are unambiguous. Allowing for greater access to CP arrangements for the growers and permitting the setting up of larger blocks has the potential to enhance farm-level productivity by drawing in the most entrepreneurial investors, through the benefits of economies of scale and through reduced income and effort-sharing practices.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We started off by asking whether land tenure type impinges on farm-level productivity. The answer, according to the research results reported in this paper, is in the affirmative. This has been shown via the application of a simple analytical framework on survey-level evidence from 128 smallholder oil palm blocks from Papua New Guinea. This data lends itself to the proposed analysis neatly, since a homogenous output is produced and sold to a single buyer at a predetermined price using close to identical inputs except for the land tenure arrangements used to grow the crop. The findings lend considerable support to the proposition that the form of land tenure matters for farm-level productivity.
This result holds for this specific case but could hold more generally, particularly when tenure security on productivity works via the following identified channels. We find that farms expand only when tenure security is present, thus the realization of productivity gains from economies of scale requires tenure security. To the best of our knowledge, this particular channel of the link between land tenure form and farmlevel productivity has not been noted in the extant literature. Second, sharing of proceeds from the sale of farm output lowers the incentives for expanding effort and resources into long-term investments. The impact of the above is particularly punitive in the case of a tree crop where investments have a long gestation. Once again, greater security to the proceeds of investment to an individual grower/household has the potential to induce increased investments and effort, both of which would raise income and farm-level productivity. Finally, agricultural productivity can be raised through land reform if and only if land tenure type has a causal impact on farm-level productivity. This is found to be true for the oil palm sector within the West New Britain province of Papua New Guinea. The channels of influence from land tenure form to farm-level productivity are via scale effects and disincentive effects of income and effort sharing common on farms with insecure rights to income from the sale of produce. Furthermore, customary purchase arrangements, which attract the most entrepreneurial farmers, could also have contributed to the higher productivity of this tenure form. Each of the above observations has distinct policy lessons: the first suggests that improved access to land has the potential to raise the size of farms and with it the benefits of economies of scale; the second suggests that tenure security has the potential to increase longterm investments and effort at the level of individual farms and that greater security to proceeds from investment has the potential to improve farm husbandry and consequently agricultural productivity; and, the third suggests that facilitating a land market on a competitive basis could raise agricultural productivity as a whole.
